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U.S. Policy and the International
Criminal Court
David J. Scheffer*
The United States has had and will continue to have a compelling interest
in the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. We have
long contemplated an international criminal court. Such a court can both
deter and punish those who might escape justice in national courts. As
head of the U.S. Delegation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) talks
since mid-1997, I can confirm that the United States has had an abiding
interest in supporting an ICC that would operate efficiently, effectively,
and appropriately within a global system that also requires our constant
vigilance to protect international peace and security. However, based on
international law and the reality of our international system, we refused to
support the final draft of the Treaty in Rome last summer.
On December 8, 1998, we joined the consensus in the U.N. General
Assembly to adopt a resolution creating the Preparatory Commission on
the ICC (PrepCom), the first session of which met in New York under the
expert leadership of Philippe Kirsch, the Legal Adviser of the Canadian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Last month I led the U.S. Delegation in the
critical work of the PrepCom to develop the Elements of Crimes and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This summer the PrepCom will afford
an opportunity to address concerns we and others have had about the
effectiveness and acceptance of the ICC. This is an important opportunity.
We believe the problems in the Rome Treaty that prevent us from signing it
can be solved, and that it is in the interest of all governments to address
those problems now so that we can all be active partners in the ICC. There
is far more to lose in the effectiveness of the ICC if the United States is not
a Treaty Partner than there is to gain from its current dubious regime of
jurisdiction. As I said at the United Nations last October, we do not pre-
tend to know all the answers. We surely hope some creative thinking can
be generated in the months ahead.
At the Rome conference last summer, the U.S. Delegation worked with
other delegations to achieve important objectives. One major objective was
a strong complementary regime, namely, deferral to national jurisdiction.
A key purpose of the ICC should be to promote observance and enforce-
ment of international humanitarian law by domestic legal systems. There-
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fore, we were pleased to see the adoption of Article 18 (preliminary rulings
regarding admissibility),1 drawn originally from a U.S. proposal, and its
companion Articles 17 and 19.2 We considered it only logical that, when
an investigation of an overall situation is initiated, relevant and capable
national governments be given an opportunity under reasonable guidelines
by the court to investigate their own nationals or others within their
jurisdiction.
Our negotiators successfully preserved appropriate decision-making
for sovereigns that are obligated to cooperate with the court. Some dele-
gates were tempted to require unqualified cooperation by States Parties
with all court orders, notwithstanding relevant national judicial proce-
dures. Such obligations of unqualified cooperation were unrealistic and
would have raised serious constitutional issues not only in the United
States but in many other States. Part 9 of the Statute3 represents hard-
fought battles in this respect. The requirement that States Parties "shall
ensure that there are procedures available under their national law ''4 is
pragmatic and legally essential for the successful operation of the court.
We were pleased that participating delegations discussed the Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence with a constructive attitude at the February session of
the PrepCom. Some progress was made, and we trust that the groundwork
has now been laid to accelerate the work on the Rules in the months ahead.
The procedures established for the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia show that some sensitive information collected by a
government could be made available as lead evidence to the prosecutor,
provided that these detailed procedures are strictly followed. We applied
this experience to the challenge of similar cooperation with a permanent
court. It was not easy. Some delegations argued that the court should have
the final determination on the release of all national security information
requested from a government. This argument is inconsistent with the
Rome Statute since Article 725 states that a national government must have
the right of final refusal if the request pertains to its national security. In
the case of a government's refusal, the court may seek a remedy from the
Assembly of States Parties or the Security Council.
The United States helped lead the successful effort to ensure that the
ICC's jurisdiction over crimes against humanity shall include acts in inter-
nal armed conflicts and acts in the absence of armed conflict. We argued
successfully that there had to be a reasonably high threshold for such
crimes. The same standard should apply in war crimes. A major achieve-
ment of Article 8 of the Treaty is its application to war crimes committed
during internal armed conflicts.6 In order to widen acceptance of the
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.183/
9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999, 1012.
2. Id. at 1012-14.
3. Id. at 1051-61.
4. Id. at 1052.
5. Id. at 1043.
6. Id. at 1006.
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application of the Statute to war crimes committed during internal armed
conflicts, the United States helped negotiate language that excludes situa-
tions of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and spo-
radic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature.
The U.S. Delegation insisted that definitions of war crimes be drawn
from customary international law and that they respect the requirements
and intent of military objectives during combat. We had long sought a
high threshold for the court's jurisdiction over war crimes, since individual
soldiers often commit isolated war crimes that by themselves should not
automatically trigger the massive machinery of the ICC. We believe the
definition arrived at serves our purposes well: "The Court shall have juris-
diction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as a part of
a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes."
7
One of the more difficult, but essential, issues to negotiate was the
treatment of crimes against women, either as a crime against humanity or
as a war crime. The U.S. Delegation worked hard to include explicit refer-
ences to crimes relating to sexual assault in the text of the Statute. Such
crimes include rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced preg-
nancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence of sig-
nificant magnitude. We were also instrumental in creating acceptable
definitions of command responsibility that reach into civilian chains of
command and the defense of superior orders.
Our emphasis on the Elements of Crimes resulted in Article 9 of the
Treaty,8 which requires their preparation - a task that governments have
now undertaken in the PrepCom. This task is critical in order to transform
international norms into individual criminal culpability. We have to bal-
ance the rights of the accused and due process with the interests of interna-
tional justice. Despite some early criticism directed at U.S. motivations, we
are pleased that work on the Elements progressed well during the first ses-
sion of the PrepCom and that there is now a very good basis for making
more progress. We look forward to. more constructive and cooperative
work with delegations in the months ahead. We trust that early skepticism
about the intent behind our draft Elements has been put to rest and that
serious professional work can now continue in order to complete the work
on Elements of Crimes as soon as possible.
These accomplishments and others in the Rome Treaty are significant.
However, the U.S. Delegation was not prepared at any time during the
Rome Conference to accept text that represented a political compromise on
fundamental issues of international criminal law and international peace
and security. We could not negotiate as if certain risks could be easily
dismissed or certain procedures of the permanent court would be infalli-
ble. We could not bargain away unique security requirements or our need
to uphold basic principles of international law even if some of our closest
allies reached their own level of satisfaction with the final Treaty. The
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1009.
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United States made compromises throughout the negotiations in Rome but
always emphasized that the issue of jurisdiction had to be resolved satisfac-
torily or else the entire Treaty and the integrity of the court would be
imperiled.
The theory of universal jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes seized the imagination of many delegates negoti-
ating the ICC Treaty. They appeared to believe that the ICC should be
empowered to do what some national governments have done unilaterally,
namely, to enact laws that empower their courts to prosecute any individu-
als, including non-nationals, who commit one or more of these crimes.
Some governments have enacted such laws, which theoretically, but rarely
in practice, make their courts arenas for international prosecutions. The
problem for any national government seeking to exercise such universal
jurisdiction is to exercise personal jurisdiction over the suspect. Without
custody, or the prospect of it through an extradition proceeding, a national
court's claim of universal jurisdiction is necessarily and rightly limited.
Admittedly, many recent international treaty regimes, including those
directed at terrorism, have used universal jurisdiction as a means of
enforcement. Under such a treaty, criminals involved in airplane hijacking,
airplane bombings, and attacks on diplomats as internationally protected
persons, can be tried in the courts of any treaty signatory, no matter the
place of the offense or the nationality of the victim. The treaties against
hostage-taking and torture also provide for universal jurisdiction, as the
lawyers for General Augusto Pinochet have recently learned. However, the
exercise of universal jurisdiction is limited to treaty parties. Additionally,
use of universal jurisdiction in the operational law of war has been halting.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions make use of it for grave breaches of the
conventions, but these four conventions are limited to the deliberate mis-
treatment of civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded, and the ship-
wrecked. 9 The Hague regulations and the laws and customs of war which
establish the limits on war do not directly provide for universal jurisdic-
tion. Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions defines as a grave
breach any disproportionate use of force, or the use of force in environmen-
tally objectionable ways, but the United States and a number of other coun-
tries have not yet ratified Protocol I. Thus, the universal jurisdiction
created by the Rome Conference would mean something new, at least for
U.S. troops stationed abroad.
The ICC is designed as a treaty-based court with the unique power to
prosecute and sentence individuals, but also to impose obligations of coop-
eration upon the contracting states. A fundamental principle of interna-
9. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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tional treaty law is that only states that are party to a treaty should be
bound by its terms. Yet Article 12 of the ICC Treaty reduces the need for
ratification of the treaty by national governments by providing the ICC
with jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-party state.10 Under Article
12, the ICC may exercise such jurisdiction over anyone, anywhere in the
world, even in the absence of a referral by the Security Council, if either the
state of the territory where the crime was committed or the state of nation-
ality of the accused consents.' Ironically, the Treaty exposes non-parties
in ways that the parties themselves are not exposed.
Why is the United States so concerned about the status of non-party
states under the ICC Treaty? Why not, as many have suggested, simply
sign and ratify the Treaty and thus eliminate the problem of non-party sta-
tus? First, fundamental principles of treaty law still matter and we are
loath to ignore them with respect to any state's obligations vis-A-vis a treaty
regime. While certain conduct is prohibited under customary interna-
tional law and might be the object of universal jurisdiction by a national
court, the establishment of, and a state's participation in, an international
criminal court are not derived from custom but, rather, from the require-
ments of treaty law.
Second, even if the Clinton Administration were in a position to sign
the Treaty, U.S. ratification could take many years and stretch beyond the
date of entry into force of the Treaty. Thus, the United States could have
non-party status under the ICC Treaty for a significant period of time. The
crimes within the court's jurisdiction also go beyond those arguably cov-
ered by universal jurisdiction, and court decisions or future amendments
could effectively create "new" and unacceptable crimes. Moreover, the abil-
ity to withdraw from the Treaty, should the court develop in unacceptable
ways, would be negated as an effective protection.
Equally troubling are the implications of Article 12 for the future will-
ingness of the United States and other governments to take significant
risks to intervene in foreign lands in order to save human lives or to restore
international or regional peace and security. The illogical consequence
imposed by Article 12, particularly for non-parties to the Treaty, will be to
limit severely those lawful, but highly controversial and inherently risky,
interventions that the advocates of human rights and world peace so des-
perately seek from the United States and other military powers. There will
be significant new legal and political risks in such interventions, which up
to this point have been mostly shielded from politically motivated charges.
We dearly recognize the dilemma posed by the limitations of Article
12, namely that it will exclude from the court's jurisdiction strictly internal
atrocities committed by non-consenting non-party states, absent a Security
Council referral. On the one hand, we object to any presumption that sixty
ratifications of the Treaty, and its entry into force, automatically exposes
every individual everywhere in the world to the ICC's jurisdiction unless
10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 1, at 1010.
11. Id.
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the Security Council exercises its Chapter VII powers. We always envis-
aged this Treaty regime's reach to grow as more states ratify it. However,
we did not envisage the Security Council giving the court the ability to
leap-frog over jurisdictional barriers. On the other hand, we are open to
considering ways to address the most obvious manifestation of contempo-
rary illegality, namely the self-inflicted atrocity by the rogue regime. The
obvious procedure is the Security Council referral.
In Rome, the U.S. Delegation offered various proposals to correct the
jurisdictional problem. The other permanent members of the Security
Council joined us in a compromise formula during the last week of the
Rome conference. One of our proposals was to exempt from the ICC's
jurisdiction conduct that, in the absence of a Security Council referral,
arises from the official actions of a non-party state acknowledged as such
by that non-party. This would require a non-party state to acknowledge
official responsibility for an atrocity in order to be exempted, an unlikely
occurrence for those who usually commit genocide or other serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law. In contrast, the United States
would confirm as a matter of course its participation in international
peacekeeping and enforcement actions. It is likely that there would be odi-
ous non-party regimes that would not blink at admitting genocide as an
official state policy. However, that simply reflects the fact that the ICC
cannot pretend to cover everyone everywhere under every circumstance if
the Security Council fails to act. Regrettably, our proposed amendments to
Article 12 were rejected on the premise that the proposed draft of the
Treaty was so fragile that if any part were reopened, the conference would
fall apart.
The final text of the Treaty includes the crime of aggression, albeit
undefined until a Review Conference seven years after entry into force of
the Treaty will determine the meaning of aggression. This political conces-
sion to the most persistent advocates of a crime of aggression without a
consensus definition and without the linkage to a prior Security Council
determination that an act of aggression has occurred, should concern all of
us. The PrepCom is addressing the issue, however, and we hope it will
proceed responsibly in the years ahead. If handled poorly, this issue alone
could fatally compromise the ICC's future credibility.
I will not belabor the final hours of the conference except to say that it
could have been done differently and the outcome might have been far
more encouraging. While we firmly believe that the true intent of national
governments cannot be that which now appears reflected in a few key pro-
visions of the ICC Treaty, the political will remains within the Clinton
Administration to support a treaty that is fairly and realistically consti-
tuted. We hope developments will unfold in the future so that the consid-
erable support that the United States could bring to a properly constituted
international criminal court can be realized.
